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Abstract
This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a
mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets
all the demand coming to it. If the private firm is free to supply
less than demand, then the unique CPNE involves the competitive
price. If however the private firm also has to supply all its demand,
then the set of CPNE prices turns out to be an interval, with prices
ranging from the socially optimal one, to the price under complete
privatization.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines a mixed duopoly with price competition where the
public firm supplies all the demand coming to it. In the presence of limited
cooperation among the firms, we find that the welfare maximizing price is
implemented whenever the private firm is free to supply less than demand. If
however the private firm has to meet all its demand, then there are multiple
equilibria, with the equilibrium price being at least as large as the welfare
maximizing one, but can be higher.
Price competition where firms meet all demand dates back to Chamberlin
(1933). While the literature explores this formulation in the context of pri-
vate firms,1 there is relatively little work in the context of mixed oligopoly.
This is surprising given that the very existence of public firms can be traced
to governmental concerns with welfare, in particular high prices,2 and that
these same concerns may lead to government regulations that mandate that
public firms supply all demand.
Vives (1999) for example mentions that in regulated industries like elec-
tricity, or telephone, regulations that firms supply all demand are in force
in the USA. Spulber (1989) argues that the common carrier regulation can
lead to a scenario where firms supply all demand. This framework is natural
whenever costs of turning away customers are high and may arise even in
the absence of governmental regulations, e.g. in the presence of reputational
costs of turning customers away.3
A similar assumption for the private firms may be natural if, for exam-
ple, the government is concerned with maintaining a level playing field. In
the absence of such concerns however, such an assumption may be less com-
pelling. We therefore consider both cases, first where the public firm supplies
1See, among others, Vives (1999), Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004), etc.
2In fact, Cremer et al. (1989) view the public firm primarily as a tool for regulating
an oligopoly market.
3Such costs are routinely assumed in the operations research literature (see, Taha
(1982)).
1
all demand but the private firm is free to supply less than demand, and sec-
ond, where both firms must meet all demand. For ease of reference, we shall
call these the semi-Bertrand, and the Bertrand form of price competition
respectively.
We allow for the possibility of limited cooperation among the firms, thus
focusing on equilibria that are immune to group deviations. Formally, the
solution concept is the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), introduced
in Bernheim et al. (1987) and Bernheim and Whinston (1987).4 We however
also examine the outcome under Nash equilibrium.
The results depend critically on the form of competition. Under semi-
Bertrand competition, interestingly we find that the first best can be imple-
mented in that there is a unique CPNE that involves all firms charging the
competitive price. This is surprising given that under quantity competition
the mixed oligopoly equilibrium differs from the first best.5 In fact, as is
well known, implementing the first best under mixed oligopoly with quantity
competition requires a uniform subsidy.6 Further, given that a CPNE fails
to exist in many games,7 the existence result is of independent theoretical
interest.
Under Bertrand competition however, while the welfare maximizing price
can be sustained as a CPNE, so can be the price under complete privatization.
We then characterize the set of CPNE prices, demonstrating that it is an
interval, with prices ranging from the welfare maximizing one, to the price
4Such coordination may be facilitated by the government and its regulatory agencies.
In the Indian telecommunications industry for example, private firms, e.g. Bharti-Airtel,
etc. compete with government firms like VSNL and MTNL. The industry is regulated
by the governmental regulatory authority, TRAI, which coordinates among the various
players, keeping an eye on various policies followed by the firms. Further, these firms may
regularly interact in various professional bodies, e.g. FICCI, ASSOCHAM, etc., that act
on behalf of private firms.
5See, e.g. De Fraja and Delbono (1990).
6See, among others, White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Myles (2002), Fjell and
Heywood (2004), Tomaru (2006) and Kato and Tomaru (2007).
7See, e.g. Bernheim et al. (1987) and Bernheim and Whinston (1987).
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under complete privatization.
Given the importance of this market form there is a large and growing
literature on mixed oligopoly. The early work of Merrill and Schneider (1966)
has been followed by, among others, Cremer et al. (1989, 1991), De Fraja and
Delbono (1989) and Anderson et. al. (1997), focusing, among other issues,
on the effects of privatization on welfare.8 We refer the readers to De Fraja
and Delbono (1990) for a succinct survey of the early literature. However,
while there has been some work on mixed oligopoly with price competition,
e.g. Anderson et al. (1995) and Ghosh and Mitra (2008), these are mainly
in the context of differentiated products. There is very little work on price
competition with homogeneous products where the public firm has to supply
all demand. This paper makes a beginning in this respect.
The next section sets up the model and derives some preliminary results.
Section 3 solves for the coalition-proof equilibria under both market forms,
Bertrand, as well as semi-Bertrand. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There is one public and one private firm, firm 1 and firm 2 respectively,
both producing a homogeneous good. The private firm is a profit maximizer,
whereas the public firm maximizes social welfare.
The output of the i-th firm is denoted qi, with both firms producing a
homogeneous product with a demand function D(p), and the cost function
8While the earlier literature mostly deals with the issue of full socialization versus full
privatization, Matsumura (1998), Matsumura and Kanda (2003), Chao and Yu (2006),
Fujiwara (2007) and Roy Chowdhury (2009), among others, examine the case of partial
privatization. Another branch of the literature deals with the so called irrelevance prin-
ciple, see, e.g. White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Myles (2002), Fjell and Heywood
(2004), Tomaru (2006), Kato and Tomaru (2007) and Roy Chowdhury (2009). Further,
while many of these papers deal with domestic firms, Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White
(1998), Fjell and Heywood (2002), Matsumura (2003) and Matsushima and Matsumura
(2006), among others, examine mixed oligopoly with foreign firms.
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of both firms are denoted by c(q). The following two assumptions on D(p)
and c(q) are maintained throughout the analysis.
A1: D : [0,∞) → [0,∞). D(p) is twice differentiable and strictly de-
creasing for all p such that D(p) > 0. There exists a choke-off price K such
that D(p) > 0 if and only if p < K.
A2: c : [0,∞) → [0,∞). c(q) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly convex for all q > 0. Further, c′(0) < K.
The firms simultaneously announce their prices. The public firm supplies
the whole of the demand coming to it at that price vector. Under Bertrand
competition the private firm also supplies all demand, while under semi-
Bertrand competition the private firm is free to supply less than the quantity
demanded. Let pi denote the price charged by firm i.
We need some notations and preliminary results.
2.1 Bertrand Competition
Letting Di(p1, p2) denote the residual demand facing firm i under Bertrand
competition
Di(p1, p2) =

0, if pi > pj,
D(pi)
2
, if pi = pj,
D(pi), if pi < pj.
Thus the profit of the i-th firm under Bertrand competition is
pii(p1, p2) = piDi(p1, p2)− c(Di(p1, p2)), i = 1, 2, (1)
and letting p = min{p1, p2}, the aggregate welfare under Bertrand competi-
tion
W (p1, p2) = pi1(p1, p2) + pi2(p1, p2) +
∫ D(p)
0
D−1(q)dq − pD(p). (2)
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Thus firm 1 (the public firm) maximizes welfare, i.e. W (p1, p2), whereas
the private firm maximizes profit, i.e. pi2(p1, p2). We solve for the pure
strategy coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in prices (henceforth CPNE).
Definition. A price vector(p1, p2) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and
only if W (p1, p2) ≥ W (p′1, p2) ∀p′1, and pi2(p1, p2) ≥ pi2(p1, p′2) ∀p′2. Let Γ be
the set of Nash equilibrium price vectors.
Definition. A price vector (p1, p2) ∈ Γ constitutes a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium (CPNE) if and only if there exists no other (p′1, p
′
2) ∈ Γ such that
W (p′1, p
′
2) > W (p1, p2) and pi2(p
′
1, p
′
2) > pi2(p1, p2).
Next let W (p) denote the welfare when both firms charge the same price
p, whereas W (p) denotes the social welfare when one of the firms charge a
price p that is strictly lower than that charged by the other firm. Formally
W (p) = W (p1, p2)|p1=p2=p,
W (p) = W (p1, p2)|pi=p<pj , (3)
From the convexity of c(q) it is easy to see that W (p) > W (p), ∀p < K.
Similarly, let pi(p) denote the profit when of both the firms when they
both charge the same price p, whereas pi(p) denotes the the profit of a firm
that charges a price p that is strictly lower than that charged by the other
firm. Formally
pi(p) = pii(p1, p2)|p1=p2=p,
pi(p) = pii(p1, p2)|pi=p<pj . (4)
We need another assumption.
A3: pi(p), pi(p), W (p) and W (p) are all strictly quasi-concave in p.
Remark 1 Note that A3 is satisfied for linear demand and quadratic
cost functions. Further, A3 implies that for pi(p), pi(p), W (p) and W (p) the
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maximizing price is unique whenever it exists. Further, these functions are
all monotonic to the left and to the right of the respective maximizing prices.
Let pC denote the competitive price that maximizes W (p). Clearly, pC
satisfies
p = c′(
D(p)
2
). (5)
Moreover, let pˆ = argmax pi(p), so that pˆ solves
p = c′(
D(p)
2
)− D(p)
D′(p)
. (6)
In Lemmas 1 and 2 below we develop some preliminary results that we
shall need for our subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1 Let A1-A3 hold. (i) pC < pˆ.
(ii) pi(pC) ≥ 0.
(iii) pi(pc) ≥ pi(p), ∀p ≤ pC .
(iv) pi(0) > pi(0).
Proof. (i) Follows from Eq. (5) and (6).
(ii) pi(pC) = D(p
C)
2
[pC − c(D(pC)/2)
D(pC)/2
] > D(p
C)
2
[pC − c′(D(pC)/2)] = 0, where
the first inequality follows since c(q) is strictly convex and D(pC) > 0.
(iii) Consider p < pC . Then D(p) > D(p)/2 > c′−1(p). Since pq − c′(q) is
strictly convex in q, and is maximized at c′−1(p), it follows that pi(p) > pi(p).
Consequently,
pi(pC) ≥ pi(p) > pi(p),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1(i) and the fact that pi(p) is
increasing for p ≤ pˆ.
(iv) Follows since pi(0) = −c(D(0)
2
) > −c(D(0)) = pi(0).
We then have
Lemma 2 Let A1-A3 hold. At any p solving pi(p) = pi(p), both pi(p) and
W (p) are increasing in p.
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Proof. Note that any such p solves
p =
c(D(p))− c(D(p)/2)
D(p)/2
,
so that from strict convexity of c(q) we have that p < c′(D(p)).
Consequently, note that at such a p,
pi′(p) = D(p) +D′(p)[p− c′(D(p))] > 0,
and
W ′(p) = D′(p)[p− c′(D(p))] > 0,
from the previous paragraph.
Next define p to be the maximal p < K, such that pi(p) = pi(p).
A4: pi(p) and pi(p) are strictly concave in p.
We need one more lemma.
Lemma 3 Given A1-A4, there is a unique price p such that pi(p) = pi(p).
Proof. Given Lemma 2, pi(p) is positively sloped at p = p. Hence if there
are multiple such intersections, then concavity of pi(p) must be violated.
2.2 Semi-Bertrand Competition
Let the residual demand facing firm i under semi-Bertrand competition be
denoted by D′i(p1, p2). Given that the public firm meets all demand, the
residual demand facing the private firm takes the same form as that under
Bertrand competition, so that D′2(p1, p2) = D2(p1, p2). The residual demand
for the public firm however will change form given that the private firm will
supply min{D′2(p1, p2), c′−1(p2)}. Thus assuming that the residual demand
facing firm 1 is parallel in nature
D′1(p1, p2) =

D(p1), if p1 < p2,
D(p1)−min{D(p1)2 , c′−1(p1)}, if p1 = p2,
max{D(p1)−min{D(p2), c′−1(p2)}, 0}, if p1 > p2.
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Thus the profit function under semi-Bertrand competition is
pi′i(p1, p2) = piD
′
i(p1, p2)− c(D′i(p1, p2)), i = 1, 2. (7)
Next let CS(p1, p2) denote the consumers’ surplus.
9 Then the aggregate
welfare
W ′(p1, p2) = pi′1(p1, p2) + pi
′
2(p1, p2) + CS(p1, p2). (8)
Thus firm 1 maximizes W ′(p1, p2), whereas the private firm maximizes
pi′2(p1, p2). The CPNE for this case can be defined, with appropriate modifi-
cations, in a manner analogous to that for the Bertrand case.
3 The Analysis
We then solve for the set of CPNE under both semi-Bertrand and Bertrand
competition.
3.1 Semi-Bertrand Competition
We first consider the case where the private firm is free to supply less than the
quantity demanded, but the public firm supplies all demand. We find that
there is a unique CPNE that involves both firms charging the competitive
price pC . Thus under semi-Bertrand mixed oligopoly, the outcome involves
the first best. Further, implementing the first best does not involve any
subsidy.
Proposition 1 Let A1-A3 hold. Under semi-Bertrand competition, the unique
CPNE involves both firms charging the welfare maximizing price pC.
Proof. We begin by showing that both firms charging pC constitutes a
CPNE. Note that in this case both firms supply till marginal cost. We first
9Thus, for p1 ≤ p2, CS(p1, p2) =
∫D(p1)
0
D−1(q)dq−p1D(p1). For p1 > p2, CS(p1, p2) =∫max{D(p1)−min{D(p2),c′−1(p2)},0}+min{D(p2),c′−1(p2)}
0
D−1(q)dq − p2 min{D(p2), c′−1(p2)} −
p1 max{D(p1)−min{D(p2), c′−1(p2)}, 0}.
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argue that neither firm has an incentive to deviate from pC . Consider the
public firm. Since pC maximizes welfare, no deviation can be profitable.
Next consider the private firm, i.e. firm 2. If it charges a higher price,
then its profit drops to zero. Given Lemma 1(ii), this is not profitable.
Undercutting is not profitable either since it supplies till marginal cost under
both situations, but the price is lower in case it undercuts. Next note that
no profitable joint deviation from pC exists since pC maximizes welfare.
We next argue that no other CPNE exists. If both firms charge the same
price p′, where p′ > pC , then firm 2 has an incentive to undercut. This follows
since firm 2 is demand contstrained at this p′, i.e. D(p′)/2 < c′−1(p′). Hence
if it undercuts to p′ −  and supplies till min{D(p′ − ), c′−1(p′ − )}, then
its profit goes up for  sufficiently small. In case both firms charge p′′ where
p′′ < pC , then a joint deviation to pC increases welfare. Further, the profit
of firm 2 increases as it supplies till marginal cost under both situations but
pC > p′′.
Finally, we cannot have an equilibrium where the lower priced firm charges
a price p′′′ different from pC . If firm 2 is charging p′′′, then firm 1 can match
this price when welfare goes up. Whereas if firm 1 is charging p′′′, then firm
2 can match this price and supply till its marginal cost, when it gains.
Remark 2 Note that the proof of Proposition 1 does not depend on the
fact that the residual demand facing firm 1 is parallel, and thus goes through
in case the residual demand function is proportional as well.
Remark 3 It is easy to check that pC can be sustained as a Nash equi-
librium, and further that no price larger than pC can be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium.
3.2 Bertrand Competition
We next consider the case where both firms must meet all demand. This
is of interest if, for example, the government insists on maintaining a level
playing field for all firms.
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In the next three propositions we characterize the set of prices that can
be sustained as CPNE under Bertrand competition. To begin with we can
mimic the argument in Proposition 1 to show that the competitive price can
be sustained as a CPNE.10
Proposition 2 Let A1-A3 be satisfied. Under Bertrand competition, the
welfare maximizing price pC can be sustained as a CPNE with both firms
charging pC.
Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004) demonstrate that the unique CPNE
outcome under complete privatization (where both firms maximize profits)
involves both firms charging a price of min{pˆ, p}. Note that min{pˆ, p} > pC .
Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that this price can be sustained as a
CPNE of the Bertrand mixed duopoly game.
Proposition 3 Let A1-A3 be satisfied. Under Bertrand competition, min{pˆ, p}
(the price under complete privatization) can be sustained as a CPNE with both
firms charging min{pˆ, p}.
Proof. We first argue that no profitable joint deviation exists that is
proof to individual deviations. If pˆ ≤ p, then there is nothing to prove. So
let p < pˆ. Then for any decrease in price pi(p) falls, whereas for an increase in
price W (p) decreases. We then examine if there can be profitable individual
deviations. Consider the public firm. By Lemma 2, W (p) is increasing to the
left of p, and moreover W (p) > W (p), so undercutting is welfare reducing.
Next consider the private firm. Since p ≤ min{p, pˆ}, pi(p) ≥ pi(p). Thus by
Lemma 2, undercutting is not profitable for firm 2.
We next argue that under an additional assumption A4, all prices p ∈
(pC ,min{p, pˆ}) can be sustained as a CPNE. Further, no other CPNE exists.
10The argument that the private firm has no incentive to undercut follows from Lemma
1(iii) for this case.
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Proposition 4 Let A1-A4 hold. Any price p ∈ [pC ,min{p, pˆ}] can be sus-
tained as a CPNE. Further, no price less than pC, or greater than min{p, pˆ}
can be sustained.
Proof. Note that for any p ∈ (pC ,min{p, pˆ}) no profitable joint deviation
exists. By Lemma 2, the public firm does not have a profitable individual
deviation. Thus for any such p to be sustained as a CPNE, it is sufficient to
rule out undercutting by the private firm. This follows since from Lemma 3,
pi(p) and pi(p) has a unique intersection at p.
We then argue that no other price can be sustained as a CPNE. Consider
an outcome where the active firm charges a price less than pC . Then a joint
deviation to pC clearly increases welfare. Further, firm 2’s profit increases as
pˆ > pC and pi(p) is increasing for p < pC . Further, this joint deviation to pC
is proof to individual deviations.
Next consider an outcome where the active firm charges p > p. If both
firms are active, then firm 2 can undercut and gain. So let only one firm be
active. If firm 1 is the active firm, it can reduce price, when welfare increases.
Whereas if firm 2 is the active firm, then firm 1 can match this price, when
welfare increases. So let pˆ < p ≤ p. Then a joint deviation to pˆ benefits both
firms (for firm 1 welfare increases since pC < pˆ) and is proof to individual
deviations.
Remark 4 At this point it may be of interest to examine the set of Nash
equilibrium prices under mixed Bertrand duopoly. Let p˜ denote the minimal
p satisfying pi(p) = 0. It is straightforward to check that under A1-A4, the
set of Nash equilibrium prices is [p˜, p].11 Note that p˜ < pC, so that under
Nash equilibrium prices lower than the competitive price may be sustainable.
It is often argued that public firms curb the private firms’ incentive to
charge high prices. As our analysis shows, while this intuition goes through
under semi-Bertrand Competition (with the welfare maximizing price being
implemented), under Bertrand competition this intuition turns out to be only
11A proof is available on request.
11
half-true given there are multiple equilibria. While the welfare maximizing
price turns out to be a CPNE, there are other equilibria that involve higher
prices. In particular the price under complete privatization turns out to be
an equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines a mixed duopoly with price competition, focusing on
two aspects that are new in the literature, first that the public firm supplies
all demand, and second, allowing for limited cooperation among the firms.
In contrast to the literature on quantity competition, under semi-Bertrand
competition we find that the outcome involves the first best. Further, im-
plementing the first best does not involve any subsidy. If however the pri-
vate firm also has to supply all demand, then while the welfare maximizing
price turns out to be a CPNE, there are other equilibria that involve higher
prices. Finally, turning to robustness issues, while we restrict attention to
the duopoly case, preliminary analysis suggests that the results go through
qualitatively if there is one public firm facing n ≥ 1 private firms.
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